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forged deeds, unconstitutional homestead conveyances, or tax deeds that deprive owners of land without proper procedure, none is applicable to the
instant case. The sounder policy, it seems clear, is to maintain the security of
investments made by innocent buyers to the benefit of the state.
BARRY S. MARmS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: VOLUNTARY CONSENT TO SEARCH
PURSUANT TO AN UNLAWFUL ARREST
Bailey v. State of Florida,319 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1975)
Petitioner was a passenger in an automobile stopped by police for investigation of a possible traffic violation.1 While checking petitioner's identification,
the officer discovered a plastic sandwich bag of marijuana ashes in the automobile and arrested petitioner and her companions for possession. The officer subsequently requested and petitioner consented to a search of her
cosmetic case located in the vehicle. The case contained marijuana and
cocaine, for possession of which petitioner was later convicted. The trial court
denied petitioner's motion to suppress the evidence discovered in the cosmetic
case. On appeal, 2 the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction
and held that although the officer's initial search and seizure of the sandwich
bag and the resulting arrest were illegal, 3 the narcotics found in the cosmetic
case were admissible because petitioner had consented to the search. On
certiorari,4 the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed in part,5 reversed in part,
and HELD, voluntary consent to a warrantless search must be shown by clear
and convincing proof from consideration of the totality of the circumstances.6
1. Although the automobile had been weaving slightly, the police officer found no evidence of intoxication, nor any irregularities with the driver's license or registration, and was
satisfied with the driver's explanation that he was not familiar with the vehicle.
2. Bailey v. State, 295 So. 2d 133 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
3. The court found that the checking of the passengers' identification was not authorized
by the Florida "stop and frisk" law, FLA. STAT. §901.151 (1973). Nor could the seizure of the
plastic sandwich bag be sustained by the "plain view doctrine." For a discussion of this latter
doctrine as applied to vehicular searches, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971);
Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); State v. Flores, 305 So. 2d 292 (2d D.C.A. Fla.

1974).
4. Finding jurisdiction pursuant to FLA. CONsr. art. V, §3(b), the court cited conflict with
Earman v. State, 265 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1972); Sagonias v. State, 89 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1956);
Urquhart v. State, 211 So. 2d 79 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968); Talavera v. State, 186 So. 2d 811 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
5. The court affirmed the lower court's holding that the initial search and seizure of the
plastic sandwich bag and the resulting arrest were illegal. 319 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1975).
6. The other major point on appeal, not to be covered in this comment, questioned the
propriety of conducting the hearing on petitioner's motion to suppress evidence during the
course of the jury trial. The court held that while not reversible error the preferred practice
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As a reaction to the pervasive search and seizure power exercised by the
British government,7 the United States Constitution" and every state constitution 9 guarantee the citizen protection against unreasonable search and seizure.
Although the courts strictly apply the constitutional prohibition against
searches and seizures not conducted pursuant to a valid warrant, 10 certain
sharply defined exceptions have developed and are recognized in Florida." An
exception of increasing significance 1 2 is the search conducted subsequent to a
valid consent to search. 1 '
Various rationales have been asserted to justify constitutionally a warrantless search on the basis of consent. One contention is that a search conducted
with the consent of the individual being searched is inherently reasonable.'1
Others argue that consent searches are constitutionally valid "because we permit our citizens to choose whether or not they wish to exercise their constitutional rights."' The thrust of such arguments is that the individual may waive
his rights against unreasonable search and seizure. Once the rights implicit in
is for such motions to be heard prior to trial, before jeopardy attaches by swearing of the
jury. 19 So. 2d 22, 28 (Fla. 1975); see Foster v. State, 255 So. 2d 533 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
7. For an extensive discussion of the historical development of reasonable search and
seizure principles, see Lasson, THE HISTORY
TO

THE

UNITED

STATES

CONSTFIUTION,

55

AND

DEVELOPMENT OF

THE JOHNS

HOPKINS

THE

STUDIES

FOURTH AMENDMENT
IN

HISTORICAL

AND

POLITICAL SCIENCE No. 2 (1937).

8. U.S. CONT. amend. IV. The fourth amendment is binding on the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
9. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 160 n.5 (1947) (valid search of accused's apartment incident to lawful arrest). An appendix to Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion
analyzes Supreme Court decisions involving search and seizure from 1914 to 1938 inclusive.
For the Florida constitutional provision, see FLA. CONST. art. 1, §22.
10. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Court stated that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment -subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions." ld. at 357.
11. Five exceptions are generally recognized in Florida: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest, State v. Gustafson, 258 So. 2d I (Fla. 1972), afl'd, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); (2) a search
of a vehicle based upon probable cause, Suiero v. State, 248 So. 2d 219 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971);
(3)a search based upon voluntary consent, James v. State, 223 So. 2d 52 (4th D.C.A. Fla.
1969); (4) a search based upon an emergency situation, Webster v. State, 201 So. 2d 789 (4th
D.C.A. Fla. 1967); (5) a search of certain establishments regulated by state agencies, Boynton
v. State, 64 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1953).
12. The United States Supreme Court has urged officials seeking to conduct administrative searches to gain permission by consent before resorting to the warrant process. Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539-40 (1967). But see Carter v. State, 199 So. 2d 324 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1967), which required officers to procure a warrant where sufficient opportunity
existed to do so.
13. The other exception tangentially suggested by the principal case is the development
of warrantless searches relevant to motor vehicles and traffic arrests. For an analysis of Florida
case law on this point see Bailey v. State, 295 So. 2d 133, 135-36 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974), and
Comment, The Supreme Court Gives the Green Light to Searches Incident to Traffic Arrests,

U. MIAMI L. REV. 974 (1974). Nationwide treatment of the topic may be found in Note,
Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARV. L. REV. 835 (1974).

28

14.

See Note, Consent Search: Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights, 12 ST. L.U.L.J. 297

(1968).
15. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 283 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the constitutional ban against unreasonable search and seizure are waived, any
evidence resulting from such a search is admissible, regardless of any other objections to its admissibility that might subsequently be raised. 6
The burden of proving a voluntary waiver of constitutional rights and
sustaining a valid consensual basis for a warrantless search falls upon the
prosecution."7 Traditionally, to effect a valid waiver of rights the state must
prove that the person relinquishing the right knew it existed and realized the
consequences of its waiver.' s The original test for determining the individual's
knowledge of the right waived required an evaluation of the "totality of the
circumstances" surrounding the alleged waiver. 9 Such an analysis involved a
case by case evaluation, with the result that no predictable standard of measuring knowledge developed. As the doctrine of waiver developed, qualitative
distinctions were drawn establishing differing standards for waiver of various
constitutional rights. Seeking to establish a definitive standard for measuring
knowledgeability, the Court held that waiver of fifth2O and sixth2 amendment
rights.protecting an accused during trial required an explicit advisement and
warning of their existence and the ramifications of their relinquishment. 22
Though logically applicable as a similarly conclusive standard to establish
a knowing waiver of the rights against unreasonable search and seizure, 23 the
warning requirement was rejected 24 in favor of retaining the "totality of the
16. Davis v. California, 341 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1955) (valid consensual search despite illegal trespassing in accused's motel room and eavesdropping by officers); James v. State, 80
So. 2d 699 (Fla. 1955) (search valid when clear consent given despite vehicle unlawfully detained); Escobio v. State, 64 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 1953).
17. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(h) provides remedial procedures for a defendant aggrieved by
an unlawful search and seizure. "When a defendant has shown a warrantless search, he has
presented a prima facie case of unreasonableness .... The burden then shifts to the State to
prove a legal search." Bicking v. State, 293 So. 2d 385, 385-86 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1974); accord,
State v. Hinton, 305 So. 2d 804 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1975); Mann v. State, 292 So. 2d 432 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
18. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Although dealing specifically with waiver of
an accused's right to counsel, the Court defined waiver as "an intentional relinquishment...
of a known right or privilege." Id. at 464.
19. In Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court held that the determination of knowledgeable waiver
"must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that
case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." Id. at 464.
20. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
21. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
22. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The specific holding required advising the
accused of his right to remain silent, his right to the presence of an attorney, and his right to
a warning that any statement made may be used as evidence against that individual. See also
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
23. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV. Such a result has been argued by legal commentators, see, e.g.,
Note, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal After Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUm. L. R-v. 130
(1967); Note, Consent and the Constitution After Bumper v. North Carolina, 6 CAL. WEsr L.
Rav. 316 (1970), and has been held as appropriate by some courts, see, e.g., United States v.
Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966) (consent deemed involuntary where no warning of
right to refuse consent was given to an accused under arrest in a cellblock); United States v.
Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (warning of rights would pose no burden on police
and would assure knowledgeable waiver).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Goosbey, 419 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970) .(valid consent despite
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circumstances" test.25 As applied by the courts, there is no need under this test
to establish knowledge of the right as prerequisite to its waiver. 26 Rather,
knowledge of the right to refuse consent to an unreasonable search is to be
considered as merely another factor in terms of the "totality of the circumstances."
In recent years the primary emphasis in determining the validity of a
waiver of constitutional rights has shifted to the requirement that the waiver
be voluntary. Beginning with cases involving guilty pleas, 27 the courts have increasingly stressed that the waiver must be voluntary as well as knowing. In
the consensual search context this change in focus has gone full swing: knowledge of the right waived and appreciation of the consequences of its waiver are
important only to the extent that they bear upon the voluntariness of the
s
waiver.2
Notwithstanding this shift in emphasis, the procedural method for determining voluntariness of the waiver still centers on the traditional "totality of
the circumstances" test, with its case by case analysis. -9 The thrust of the inquiry is whether the waiver was indeed voluntarily given of the individual's
free will or was merely a manifestation of express or implied coercion.30 To
determine whether an individual's will has been overborne in a particular situation, the courts have entertained a myriad of factors including the individual's
age, his physical condition, his level of education, and his overall experience
with the law.31
no warning of right to refuse applied in noncustodial context); Gorman v. United States, 380
F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1966) (warning of right to refuse consent to search seen as implicit in
warning of right to remain silent); State v. McCarty, 199 Kan. 116, 427 P.2d 616 (1967).
25. The recent landmark decision in this respect is Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973), which held "[W]hen the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result
of duress or coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined
from all the circumstances, and while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor
to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a
prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent." Id. at 248-49. This decision is analyzed in
Comment, Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure- Voluntariness of Consent, 87 HARv. L.
REv. 213 (1973).
26. An excellent example of application of the "totality of the circumstances" test is
found in United States v. Hearn, 496 F.2d 236 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974).
27. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 459 (1969).
28. See Note, C~iminal Procedure- Standards for Valid Consent to Search, 52 U.N.C. L.
REv. 644 (1974).
29. Lower Florida courts have conformed to Schneckloth and adopted the "totality of the
circumstances" test in both the prearrest and custodial settings. See State v. Othen, 300 So. 2d
732 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Mack v. State, 298 So. 2d 509 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974); State v. McClamrick, 295 So. 2d 715 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
30. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). "Where there is coercion there cannot be consent." Id. at 550; accord, Phelper v. Decker, 401 F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1968); United
States v. Vickers, 387 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 912 (1968); James v. State,
223 So. 2d 52 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
31. See Mack v. State, 298 So. 2d 509 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974), where consent to search given
by a 24 year-old student, with ihree years college experience and a prior arrest record was
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Often language barriers are determinative as to the individual's understanding of the significance of his consent. 32 Courts consider the conduct of the
investigating officer, 33 as well as the number of officers present. 34 Attention is
given to the chain of events preceding the consent.- While the consent need
take no specific form,36 the consent must not be a mere acquiescence to an officer's apparent authority to search, whether that authority stems from the unsubstantiated claim of possession of a valid warrant 7 or from the officer's assertion that the search is lawful.38 Courts have even found that a valid consent
may be given by a third person when that person possesses common authority
over the premises or effects to be searched. 39
A major consideration in the evaluation of voluntariness of the waiver is
the custodial status of the individual at the time of consent. Distinctions are
drawn based on whether the individual is in custody or under formal arrest
and whether grounds for that arrest are lawful or unlawful. Florida has adhered to the position that a voluntary consent may be given while under lawful arrest. 40 Coercion or pressure to consent to a search will not be presumed;
held valid. An inconsistent result was reached in J.W.P. v. State, 311 So. 2d 116 (1st D.C.A.
Fla. 1975), in which a juvenile was held to have voluntarily waived his rights by emptying his
pockets in response to an officer's request. In Logan v. State, 264 So. 2d 461 (4th D.C.A. Fla.
1972), a written consent was found to be voluntarily given despite the fact that the accused
signed while intoxicated.
32. E.g., Garcia v. State, 186 So. 2d 6 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966) (consent valid where Spanishspeaking accused was informed in Spanish of his right to refuse consent).
33. E.g., Earman v. State, 265 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1972) (at least one officer had drawn his
gun at time of consent); Collins v. State, 310 So. 2d 33 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1975) (no valid consent where officers entered accused's motel room with drawn guns after posing as motel management); Lightford v. State, 520 P.2d 955 (Nev. 1974) (no valid consent when police
threatened to kick down the door if consent not forthcoming).
34. E.g., United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 841 (1973);
United States v. Curiale, 414 F.2d 744 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969).
35. E.g., United States v. Hearn, 496 F.2d 263 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974)
(officers knew of contraband on premises by virtue of prior illegal search); State v. McClamrock, 295 So. 2d 715 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974) (consent invalid when after giving Miranda
warnings police refused access to an attorney).
36. The consent may be oral or in writing. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 132 So. 2d 596 (Fla.
1961), where the court rejected defendant's contention that waiver of the right to refuse consent to a search must be in writing, finding such a position "unsupported by the law of this
state .... "Id. at 597.
37. E.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (warrant subsequently found to
be invalid); Dunnavant v. State, 46 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1950) (no consent when warrant presented by officers described premises other than those searched).
38. E.g., Carter v. State, 238 So. 2d 681 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970) (beverage agents claimed
authority for general search under limited statutory authority for warrantless administrative
search of licensed lounge); Flournoy v. State, 131 Ga. App. 171, 205 S.E.2d 473 (Ct. App. Ga.
1974) (consent invalid when given at the same time officers claimed they could obtain warrant
despite lack of probable cause).
39. This doctrine has recently been affirmed in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164
(1974). See also Dees v. State, 291 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1974) (wife voluntarily consented to a search
of residence owned by husband who was under arrest).
40. See Grimes v. State, 244 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1971); State v. Spanierman, 267 So. 2d 102
(2d D.C.A. Fla. 1972); Ghelfi v. State, 229 So. 2d 593 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969); Rinehart v. State,
114 So. 2d 487 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 849 (1961).
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the fact that the individual is in custody at the time of consent "does not
render the consent involuntary as a matter of law."41 Until the present case the
Florida supreme court has not been squarely faced with the issue of whether a
42
consent may be voluntarily given while under unlawful arrest.
The court prefaced the instant decision by reiterating the Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte 3 doctrine that knowledge of the right to refuse consent is not a
prerequisite to a showing of voluntary waiver of that right: 44 "[K]nowledge or
lack of knowledge is a factor which may not be ignored but should be considered along with all other factors."4' 5 Implicit in this affirmation is the
proposition that officers do not have a duty to inform an individual of his right
to refuse consent to a search, even when the individual is in custody. This position has been uniformly adopted at the district court of appeal level, 4r but not
until the instant case has it been approved by the Florida supreme court.
Citing Schneckloth, the court employed the "totality of the circumstances"
test in its analysis of the voluntariness of consent, underscoring that test with
the requirement that any showing of a waiver of such a constitutional right be
sustained by "clear and convincing proof." 4 7 Where evidence conflicts as to the

voluntariness of the waiver, as in the instant case,48 the trier of fact is not justified in excluding the testimony of the defendant in favor of basing its findings
solely on the testimony of the arresting officer. 49 Reviewing the record in the
lower court, the court found equivocal testimony not only as to whether the
consent was voluntary, but as to whether the consent was ever given. 5°
41. Grimes v. State, 244 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1971). Although not explicitly expressed as
relevant to the decision, this case dealt specifically with consent incident to a lawful arrest;
accord, Luton v. State, 287 So. 2d 269 (Miss.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974) (lawful arrest); Ribble v. State, 503 S.W.2d 551 (Ct. Crim. App. Tex. 1974) (lawful arrest).
42. Although a similar factual situation of consent incident to an unlawful arrest arose
in Earman v. State, 265 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1972), the court there focused its attention on the
physical coercion manifested by the actions of the arresting officers and did not elaborate on
the potential effects on voluntariness of consent brought on by the accused's illegal arrest.

43. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
44. 319 So. 2d at 27.
45. Id.
46. E.g., Holt v. State, 302 So. 2d 775 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1974); State v. Othen, 300 So. 2d
732 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Dykman v. State, 300 So. 2d 695 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974); James v.
State, 223 So. 2d 52 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
47. 319 So. 2d at 28. Accord, Sagonias v. State, 89 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1956); Dunnavant v.
State, 47 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1950).
48. Since the issue of whether a valid consent to search has been given is a question of
fact for determination by the trial court, the established practice is for that determination to
"be accepted on appeal unless dearly erroneous." James v. State, 223 So. 2d 52, 56-57 (4th
D.C.A. Fla. 1969). However, an appellate court is procedurally allowed to review evidence in
the record. See FLA. Apr. R. 6.16(b).
49. The court's reasoning appears to run contrary to its holding in Slater v. State, 90
So. 2d 453 (Fla. 1956). There conflicting testimonial evidence as to the nature and fact of
consent was resolved in favor of the prosecution, the court stating: "[S]ince the trial judge was
authorized to discredit the testimony of the appellant in its entirety, it will not be considered

here." Id. at 454. That opinion, however, fails to specify the exact grounds for disallowing the
appellant's testimony.
50. The court placed great emphasis on the fact that prosecution witnesses conflicted
among themselves as to the nature of the consent. The defendant's testimony was partially
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The court thereby avoided deciding the issue of whether an individual
could voluntarily waive the right against unreasonable search and seizure following an unlawful arrest. Having found no consent, the court precluded consideration of its possible validity. Nevertheless, the court, in dicta, emphasized
the potentially coercive atmosphere surrounding an unlawful custodial situation.5' While the court refrained from stating that no valid consent could ever
be given after an illegal arrest, it acknowledged that "ordinarily consent given
after an illegal arrest will not lose its unconstitutional taint."52 Yet, without
elaborating, the court reiterated that rare instances of a valid consent pursuant
to an unlawful arrest could exist. 53 The court summarized its equivocal position by stating:
Actually, when it has been established that there have been serious illegal actions by police officers prior to an alleged consent having been
or not the congiven by a person, how can any court determine whether 54
sent was obtained by exploitation of such illegal actions?
By perpetuating the "totality of the circumstances" test, the court passed up
an opportunity to establish an objective standard by which police officers and
prosecutors could definitively determine the validity of an individual's consent.
The line of decisions precluding knowledge of the right to refuse consent as
prerequisite to its waiver specifically confined their analysis to the noncustodial
context, and made no pretext of applying it to a defendant in custody.5 However, such a requirement in the custodial context would serve the dual funccorroborated by a second officer who testified that the defendant and her fellow passengers
inquired as to the validity of the search in the absence of a valid search warrant. 319 So. 2d
at 27.
51. This element of heightened potential for coercion has been determinative in several
recent decisions. In United States v. Williams, 385 F. Supp. 1400 (E.D. Mich. 1974), the court
noted that words or acts that may show consent in some circumstances may not show consent
where the accused is in custody. Accord, United States v. Rothman, 492 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir.
1974); United States v. DeMarco, 488 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d
67 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARv.
L. REv.42 (1968). But see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
52. 319 So. 2d at 28, citing Urquhart v. State, 211 So. 2d 79 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968) and
Earman v. State, 265 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1972). This view is shared in other jurisdictions. In
Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. App. 3d 238, 529 P-2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974), the
court held that consent induced by an illegal search and seizure and arrest is not voluntary,
because it is inseparable from the unlawful conduct of the officers. In State v. Thomas, 203
S.E.2d 445 (Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. 1974), the court expressly held that evidence obtained by
reason of a search with consent after an unlawful arrest cannot be used as evidence against
the accused upon his trial. Accord, People v. Grace, 32 Cal. App. 3d 447, 108 Cal. Rptr. 66
(Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
53. Such a result was reached in Potts v. State, 500 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1973).
54. 319 So. 2d at 28.
55. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 240-41 n.29 (1973) (citing United States v.
Marresse, 336 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1964); Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1962);
Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960); Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649
(D.C. Cir. 1951)). The United States Supreme Court recently rejected an opportunity to examine the knowledge requirement in the custodial setting. Gentile v. United States, 493 F.2d
1404 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 95 S.Ct. 241 (1974).
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tions of assuring protection of the citizen's constitutional right and establishing a determinative measure for the prosecution's proof of voluntariness of
waiver. 56 When the individual is in custody, lawfully or unlawfully, a warning
of his rights would remove any taint of coercion. 5 7 The original requirement
for a warning of constitutional rights evolved in the context of a custodial
interrogation. 5s It was deemed indispensable at the time of interrogation "to
overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time." 59 Pressures attendant to custodial
interrogation are no less present in the post-arrest consent to search situation
and should be afforded the same rigid scrutinyo ° Moreover, formulating and
applying an effective warning in the investigative process would not be as constraining on police activities and efficiency as courts generally believe. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation has utilized such a warning of the right to refuse consent to search for some 35 years without adverse effect on its operation.61 The court's affirmation of the doctrine that knowledge of the right to
refuse consent is not essential to the validity of that consent is an unfortunate
impediment to the eventual formation of a predictable standard needed by
police officer and prosecutor alike.
JOHN

B.

MACDONALD

56. While not going so far as to require warnings of the right to refuse consent, many
courts have acknowledged that the government's burden of proving a voluntary consent is
greater when the accused is in custody pursuant to a valid arrest. See, e.g., United States v.
DeMarco, 488 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 971 (1974); United States v.
Jones, 475 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 841 (1973); United States v. Page, 302
F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1962).
57. In Bretti v. Wainwright, 439 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1971), while noting that warnings
prior to a consensual search may not have the same indispensability as those required prior
to a confession, the court emphasized that such warnings "do help [to] ensure that the consent is free, voluntary, and untainted by the arrest's possible illegality." Id. at 1046. Similarly,
warnings of the right to refuse consent to a search have been characterized by the courts as
good police practice. See Valerio v. State, 494 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1973); DeVoyle v. State, 471 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1971).
58. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
59. Id. at 469.
60. Analyzing consent in the unlawful arrest context, the court in United States v.
Bazinet, 462 F.2d 982 (8th Cir. 1972), noted that "the mere fact that a person has been arrested in violation of his constitutional rights casts grave doubts upon the voluntariness of
his subsequent consent. The government has a heavy burden of proof in establishing that the
consent was the voluntary act of the arrestee and . .. not the fruit of the illegal arrest." Id.
at 989. The utilization of warnings of the right to refuse consent has been advocated as a
means of overcoming the pressures inherent in the custodial situation. See, e.g., Note,
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: A New Era in Consent Searches?, 35 U. Pirr. L. Rzv. 655 (1974).
See also authorities cited note 23 supra.
61. Note, Consent Searches: A ReappraisalAfter Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. REv.
130, 143 n.75 (1967) (citing letter from J. Edgar Hoover).
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